Wednesday, 25 September 2013

Battle of Loos



By the autumn of 1915, the Allies had launched several attacks against the Germans, all largely unsuccessful. The Battle of Loos, fought from the 25th September until early October 1915, is often overlooked and certainly overshadowed by the Battle of the Somme which followed in 1916. However, it can be remembered for three important factors: it is the first time the British used chlorine gas, the Germans having been the first to use this horrific weapon in April 1915; it is the first time that Kitchener’s new armies, made up from the men who flocked to the flag in the early months of the war, went into battle, along with the Territorials, both largely untried and untested; it was a battle that ended in failure, but so nearly in success.

The battle was part of a wider campaign, with the French attacking further south at Vimy Ridge in Artois, but as with the later Battle of the Somme, the Battle of Loos occurred at neither the time nor place of Britain’s choosing, but rather as a gesture to the French, the senior partners in the alliance against the Germans.

Whilst Sir John French had overall command of the BEF in France, it was Douglas Haig that commanded the First Army; from this army were allocated six divisions to take part in the attack at Loos: three regular divisions, the 1st, 2nd and 7th; two divisions from the New Army, the 9th and 15th Scottish Divisions; and the Territorials of the 47th (London) Division. In addition, two more divisions, both New Army, the 21st and 24th, were held in reserve some six miles from the battlefield. All in all, this represented a total of around seventy five thousand men that would attack across a frontage of eight miles. This frontage was manned, from the north to the south, by: the 2nd, 9th, 7th Divisions (I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Gough); 1st, 15th, and 47th Divisions (IV Corps commanded by Lieutenant-General Rawlinson); Lieutenant-General Haking commanded XI Corps, the reserve.

Despite the fact that the gas was a disappointment, the initial assault, especially in the south, was a great success, with many of the objectives being realised on the first day; the German front-line and parts of the second-line were taken, as was the town of Loos itself. However, German counterattacks were swift and vicious, and although the two reserve divisions were committed on the first day, they were not able to participate until late on the second day. When they did, attacking in columns across the open ground between the German front and second lines, the 21st and 24th Divisions paid a terrible price, with almost one man in two becoming a casualty.

By the end of the battle some three weeks later, British casualties were in the region of 50,000 dead, missing or wounded. Amongst the dead were 2nd Lt. John Kipling, son of Rudyard Kipling; Captain Fergus Bowes-Lyon, brother of the late Queen Mother; and three divisional commanders, George Thesiger (9th Scottish Division), Thompson Capper (7th Division) and Frederick Wing (12th Division, who joined the fray in early October) making a lie of the myth that the generals stayed safe miles behind the lines in beautiful chateaux.

After the failure of the battle to breach the German line, Sir John French resigned as commander of the BEF to be replaced by Douglas Haig. It is possible that had the gas been more effective and had the reserves been in closer proximity to the battlefield so that they were fresh upon arrival, then the attack could, indeed, have breached the German line and led to breakthrough and early success on the Western Front in 1915; however, that is speculation.
 
As it was, the war dragged on for another three years, but it was to be another nine months before Britain felt strong enough to go on the offensive once more; at the Somme.

3 comments:

Paul Marks said...

Your mathematics is very poor. Of the ten thousand men of 21st and 24th Divisions who attacked on 26th September 1915, 385 officers and 7,861 men were casualties - that is not "one in two" it is more like "eight out of ten", the British soldiers could not even see the Germans they were attacking, let alone kill them. Haig lied to Haking, claiming that the reserve divisions would only be used against a retreating enemy - and then flung them against prepared defences. Haig also accidentally gassed his own men on the first day of the battle - another "detail" you forget to mention.

Scribbler said...

Dear Mr Marks,

I checked my source materials to verify my assertion that the casualties were as I stated. Niall Cherry, in his book Unfavourable Ground, states that the figures for the 21st and 24th Divisions were as follows:
21: 4051
24: 4178
This includes divisional troops as well as those in the battalions of the line. He states that this represents a figure of approximately 33%. I uprated this figure because the divisions were not always at full complement, so saying they were approaching 1 in 2 in almost bang on. That figure is appalling enough. I’m afraid that 8 out of 10 is not supported by the official figures.
Regards Haig and the gas, it was indeed Haig who had the onerous task of deciding the wind direction and strength on the day, but it was Sir John French who requested this awful weapon earlier in the year. As he was in charge, and not Haig, it must be French who carries the responsibility for its effectiveness.
The real problem, though, was lack of artillery shells – and that was caused by the Gallipoli campaign. Again, not Haig’s responsibility.
I recommend you read the Niall Cherry book, and as a follow up, Philip Warner’s Battle of Loos is excellent, too.
Thanks for reading.

Paul Marks said...

Dear Sir.

Are you saying that more than ten thousand men, from these two divisions, took part in the actual attack or not? Your reply is totally unclear.

Are you really saying that 1 in 3 of the men who actually took part in the attack were killed or wounded? Not about eight out of ten - which was the opinion of everyone who had the misfortune of actually taking part in the attack.

As for the use of gas - requesting a weapon is not the same as its operational use. If it is just going to hang about in the middle of the battle field (rather than hit the enemy) one does not use it - even if it has been made available. It was Haig (not French) who was responsible for the incompetent use of the weapon that had been made available.

On blaming Sir John French. Well Sir John French was not exactly the brightest genius (to use the language of the Duke of Wellington), but Haig's campaign to undermine him (including messages to the King himself - and long predating the Battle of Loos) was disloyal and underhand. Campaigning against one's boss (in the hope of getting his job) is bad enough in a private company - but to do so against one's commanding officer in time of war is unpardonable.

As for dragging up Gallipoli...... if you wish to discuss the incompetence of General Stopford and the others at Sulva Bay then I agree with you (100% - they turned what should have been a strategic victory into military disaster), but that is no excuse for the incompetence and folly of Douglas Haig on the Western Front.