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| A Dorset Yeoman |
One such man was 2nd Lieutenant Cecil Henry Paulet, whose name appears on the memorial at East Lydford, resting against the wall of Lydford Hall.
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| East Lydford memorial |
Brief history of Queen's Own Dorset Yeomanry
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| QODY camp just before the outbreak of war |
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| Men of the QODY in the desert |
During World War One, the Queen's Own Dorset Yeomanry (QODY) supplied three regiments for service: the original regiment, now known as the 1/1st Queen's Own Dorset Yeomanry; a second line regiment the 2/1st; and a third line regiment the 3/1st. Paulet served in the 1/1st and was involved in the last cavalry charge by a single British cavalry regiment in the Great War.
Diary of regiment's movements
- August 1914 : in Sherborne. Part of the 1st South Western Mounted Brigade.
- September 1914 : transferred to 2nd South Midland Mounted Brigade in 2nd Mounted Division.
- April 1915 : moved to Egypt.
- August 1915 : landed at Gallipoli. Served as dismounted troops and were involved in the Battle of Gallipoli, the Battle of Sari Bair, and the Battle of Scimitar Hill. Withdrew back to Egypt in December 1915.
- January 1916 : Brigade became independent command and retitled 6th Mounted Brigade. Participated in the Battle of Aqqaqia in February 1916. At this battle the retreating Senussi were attacked by the Dorset Yeomanry with drawn swords across open ground. Under fire, the Yeomanry lost half their horses, and about a third of their men and officers were casualties (58 of the 184 who took part).
- February 1917 : Brigade transferred to Imperial Mounted Division.
- June 1917 : Brigade transferred to Yeomanry Mounted Division.
- July 1918 : titles changed to 10th Cavalry Brigade in 4th Cavalry Division. Remained in Palestine until end of war.
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| Camp in the desert |
The Cavalry Charge
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| Painting of the charge |
The Queen's Own Dorset Yeomanry carried out the last cavalry charge by a single regiment from Britain, in the Western Desert in 1916. A trooper wrote home to his mother shortly after the attack:
“Colonel Souter told the Yeomen how he wished he was back in India with some real soldiers, who were smart and efficient, not like the bunch of slack-twisted scroungers, the dregs of the Dorset farm-yards which he had the misfortune to command, and that nothing, no nothing, would restore their honour, unless they made a cavalry charge. They would make that charge and he would lead them and restore their tarnished reputation. All this was passed down to the rank and file through the NCOs, with the addition of some choice adjectives.
However, by the next day he was his genial self again, but the idea of the charge was still in his mind.
The night before the battle he called us together, and gave a talk saying that given the opportunity he would lead us in a cavalry charge and finished with the remark; "There are over 200 of us and only 1500 of them with a few machine-guns; surely we can beat a bunch of scallywags like that".”
The Battle of Agagia
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| Map of the battle |
At 0930 hours on 26 February 1916, the British infantry advanced south, supported by the Queen's Own Dorset Yeomanry and armoured cars under the command of Major Hugh Richard Arthur, the Duke of Westminster. This new, mechanised, feature of warfare, consisted of eight armoured cars and an open Ford, crewed by a total of thirty men, with machine-guns.
While on the Western Front the density of troops, machine-guns and barbed wire meant that the war stagnated into trench warfare, in the Middle East the paucity of troops, hostile terrain and vast area meant that a more recognisably nineteenth century pattern of warfare still prevailed. Field Service Regulations required that:
'As the attack progresses and the enemy shows signs of retreating, the cavalry must be in a position to exploit the success to the full. The cavalry commander must keep in constant communication with the commander of the force, so that he may be in a position to anticipate orders and take advantage of fleeting opportunities of intervening in the battle.'
Early on 26 February, QODY's four squadrons (including a Bucks Yeomanry squadron), in another of their traditional roles, deployed patrols from their bivouacs and located the enemy positioned in mutual support and in depth, at Agagia. With the Senussi, a local Arab tribe, located and their positions accurately identified, General Lukin, the Field Force Commander, was able to make his plans for the attack.
A battalion of the South African Infantry Brigade, supported by a second battalion was to attack the Senussi frontally under the cover of artillery, machine-gun fire and a pair of armoured cars. Meanwhile, Colonel Souter, the CO of QODY, was ordered to deploy his three squadrons on the western flank supported by another pair of the Duke of Westminster's armoured cars. With little threat to the British flank, the QODY were to remain concentrated awaiting their moment.
The British infantry attack began at about 1100 hours on a frontage of somewhat over a mile, under the cover of a barrage. With the South African infantry advancing and the QODY visibly deploying to the western flank, the Senussi's Turkish advisors launched an outflanking/counter-attack on the eastern front but this was checked by an infantry company sent forward from the reserve battalion, supported by the concentrated fire of the South African Brigade's machine-guns and artillery.
By 1200 hours, Brigadier Lukin's advance had closed within five hundred yards of the Senussi's positions in the sand hills and, despite the enemy fire, the infantry were continuing to close with the enemy. The infantry's disciplined and, from the enemy's perspective, relentless advance continued. Despite the Turkish officers' attempts to keep the Senussi in the firing line, they started to fall back at about 1220 hours. At this stage, the Bucks Yeomanry Squadron was dispatched from its position on the eastern flank to join Colonel Souter's command, to the west, making a total of four squadron.
At 1300 hours, Colonel Souter received a message from General Lukin, warning him that he was required for mounted action and that he was to pursue and cut-off the enemy's retreat. This was in fact an example of a classic employment of light cavalry, in a role that would have been familiar to the Romans. The Yeomanry were specifically not to attack the sand hills, where they might find that they were in close country, with trenches and barbed wire, in which they would be at a severe disadvantage.
The Charge
The QODY instead, followed the Senussi's retreat about a thousand yards to the west, helping them on their way with volleys of long-range small arms fire and machine-gun fire provided by their Mounted MG Section. During this time, the armoured cars had, one-by-one, become stuck in the sand. By 1400 hours, however, the Senussi were in full flight, forming a mass of men about a mile long and 3-400 yards deep. At first, their rear guard of organised Senussi retained sufficient discipline to present a sufficiently credible threat to keep the yeomanry at bay but with fire from the sand hills now occupied by the South African infantry and the QODY's flanking fire the withdrawal was beginning to turn into a rout.
With their horses rested, and about seven miles from the sand hills, Colonel Souter saw his chance to seal victory through the destruction of the disordered Senussi force. Between 1440 and 1515 hours, the three squadrons of the Dorset Yeomanry, numbering 196 men, including regimental cooks brandishing their cleavers, advanced on the fleeing Senussi. The Turkish officers, however, rallied about five hundred tribesmen to form a rear guard around three maxim machine-guns.
The QODY deployed in two ranks on a frontage of approximately six hundred yards. They adopted an open formation, with the troopers of the front rank spaced at a distance of eight yards apart but the second rank were more concentrated at four yards.
Conventional wisdom would, however, suggest that mounted men versus machine-guns would result in equine and human bodies littering the battlefield but the casualty rate was just one in ten. The Senussi, already rattled by seeing their somewhat ill-disciplined fire fail to halt the QODY, lapsed into a desperate and inaccurate fire. One Yeoman thought that the ill-trained Senussi had, in the heat of the moment, failed to lower their sights as the range closed.
Advancing quickly over the open sandy plain, first at the trot, then at a full canter, the Yeomanry bore down on the Senussi in two waves. Their speed and lose formation served to limit casualties against less than skilled Senussi marksmen.
Closing to within a hundred yards, Colonel Souter ordered Trumpeter Routlage to sound the charge and at approximately fifty yards, the Yeomanry broke into a full thundering gallop. Most of the Senussi broke and ran; a few stood and fought but in the centre of his regiment, Colonel Souter's horse was shot down under him. Lieutenant Blaksey and some yeomen suffered a similar fate but undaunted, the yeomanry plunged in amongst the enemy, swords flashing.
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| Prisoners |
Colonel Souter’s report
“About 1 p.m. I received a message from the G.O.C. [Lukin] saying that he wished me to pursue and cut off the enemy, if possible. It was my intention to let the enemy get clear of the sand hills, where there might have been wire or trenches, and then to attack him in the open. I therefore pursued on a line parallel to, and about 1,000 yards west of, the line of retreat, attacking with dismounted fire whenever the horses wanted an easy. About 2 p.m. I saw for the first time the whole retreating force extend for about a mile, with a depth of 300 to 400 yards. In front were the camels and baggage, escorted by irregulars, with their proper fighting force (Mahafizia) and Maxims (machine-guns) forming their rear and flank guards. I decided to attack mounted. About 3 p.m. I dismounted for the last time, to give my horses a breather, and to make a careful examination of the ground over which I was about to move. By this time the Dorset Regiment was complete, and as the squadron of the Bucks had gone on ahead, and could not be found, I attacked with the Dorsets alone. The attack was made in two lines, the horses galloping steadily, and well in hand. Three Maxims were brought into action against us. But the men were splendidly led by their squadron and troop leaders [“A” Squadron - Capt. G. Dammers ; “B” Squadron - Major Reeves ; “C” Squadron - Capt. R. Gordon], and their behaviour was admirable. About fifty yards from the position I gave the order to charge, and with one yell the Dorsets hurled themselves upon the enemy, who immediately broke. In the middle of the enemy’s lines my horse was killed under me, and, by a curious chance, his dying strides brought me to the ground within a few yards of the Senussi General, Gaafar Pasha.”
Lieut. J.H. Blaksey’s report
“You must imagine a slightly undulating plain, of firm sand, with low tufts of scrub, six or eight inches high. In front of us were some low sand hills of broken country, and this was where the Senussi had made their camp. . . . By this time [3.30 p.m.] The Senussi must have been seven miles from the sand hills, where they were in the morning. . . We could hear nothing of our own guns, and three out of four of our armoured cars, which had done useful work in the morning, had by this time stuck in the sand hills.
During the day we had been firing at 900 or 1,000 yards : at 3.30 p.m. Our range was 1,200. The Dorsets were together except one troop. We probably numbered about 180. The Bucks Squadron was not with us. Then the led horses were whistled up ; we were ordered to ‘mount’ and ‘form line’. Then, and not till then, we knew what was coming. Imagine a perfectly flat plain of firm sand without a vestige of cover, and in front of us a slight ridge ; behind this and facing us were three machine-guns and at least 500 men with rifles. You might well think it madness to send 180 yeomen riding at this.
The Senussi, too, are full of pluck and handy with their machine-guns and rifles, but they are not what we should call first-class shots, otherwise I do not see how we could have done it. We were spread out in two ranks, eight yards roughly between each man of the front rank and four yards between the second. This was how we galloped for well over half-a-mile straight into their fire. The amazing thing is that when we reached them not one in ten were down. At first they fired very fast and you saw the bullets knocking up the sand in front of you, as the machine-guns popped them out, but as we kept getting closer they began to lose their nerve (I expect) and forgot to lower their sights.
Anyhow, the bullets began going over us, and we saw them firing wildly and begin to run ; but some of them - I expect the Turkish officers - kept the machine-guns playing on us. We were within 30 yards of the line when down came my mare. She was, I think, the nicest I have ever ridden - a well-known hunter in the Blackmore Vale - and in spite of want of food and water she was bounding along without the least sign of fear, as though she had left the stable. Down she fell, stone dead, fortunately, as I saw next morning, with a bullet straight through her heart.
The line swept past me and I was almost alone, but the next moment I saw a spare horse. I snatched it and galloped on after my troop, but within 100 yards down he fell like the mare. Then I had a very narrow escape. The second horse was not quite dead, and was plunging ; it took a moment to get clear of him on the ground. I had hardly done so when I saw a Senussi aiming his rifle at about 20 yards. I at once let fly with my revolver and over he rolled, but still on the ground he tried to get a shot at me, so I sent another shot after the first and that settled him.
There was no other horse to get and I was alone. Then a strange thing happened. Six or seven men had, I supposed, recognised me as an officer ; anyhow, they rushed up to me and, in abject terror, began begging me for their lives. I saw they were men of consequence, but that was all I knew ; the chief one was covered with blood, with a sword-thrust through his arm. I stood over them as best I could with my revolver, and signed to them that if they stopped their men from shooting at me I would not shoot them.
A few seconds later I remember seeing a Senussi shooting one of our wounded (they always do that). He was 50 yards off and I let fly with my revolver, but missed. Meanwhile the wounded officer had literally knelt down and tried to kiss my hand, begging for his life. Just then I saw Colonel Souter, who (like myself) had had his horse shot, and who had been momentarily stunned in the fall, and at the same time I heard cries of ‘Gafaar!’ (the Arab tribe’s leader), and saw a few Senussi running towards me. I fired off a few shots - I do not know whether I hit or not - and Colonel Souter then rushed up and put his revolver straight in Gafaar’s face - for the wounded officer was none other than he - and then began firing with me at the men who were coming on to rescue him.
Gafaar was so terrified that he himself waved them back, and then with some difficulty Colonel Souter was able to get hold of a horse to put him on and send him off with some other officers, who were his staff, under an escort to the rear. It would be difficult to describe what was going on in the meantime just behind us - such a scene of terror as it is quite impossible to imagine. The Senussi were running in all directions, shrieking and yelling and throwing away their arms and belongings ; the Yeomen after them, sticking them through the backs and slashing right and left with their swords.
The whole thing was a marvellous instance of the awful terror inspired by galloping horses and steel. Some stood their ground, and by dodging the swords, and shooting at two or three yards’ range first our horses and then our men, accounted for most of our casualties ; but it would be difficult to exaggerate their complete loss of morale as a fighting force. Had Gafaar or any one of his wretched staff - all Turkish officers, not Senussi - had an ounce of courage left they could have shot Colonel Souter and me ten times over, put their wounded general on to one of the camels, which were not fifty yards away, and taken him off. But they were half mad with fear ; the horses’ hooves had been too much for them.
Nuri [Pasha] was ridden down, whether killed or wounded or only knocked over we do not know ; but they got him away on a camel. This was the end of the day ; the infantry were far behind ; the guns had gone home. In the charge the Squadron I belong to, ‘B’ Squadron, was on the right, and my troop on the extreme right of the whole line ; so it happened that we came in for it more heavily than the left. Of the four officers in the Squadron two were killed and one wounded, and I was the fourth. I led seventeen men, ‘being my troop’, into the charge, of whom eleven were killed and one got back wounded ; only five were untouched. I had a bullet through my field-glasses, and another through the pocket of my tunic ; so my tunic is quite a relic, with the bullet hole on one side and old Gafaar’s blood on the other!
Altogether you will see I have a lot to be thankful for in getting through untouched. Colonel Souter has fought in India and during the war in France and Gallipoli, and said he had never been in such a tight corner before. It would be difficult to speak too highly of his leadership throughout the day ; he did the whole thing himself, and at one time in the charge he rode 300 yards in front of our lines to see exactly whether we were going straight.
The next day he saw Gafaar : instead of being broken and in fear of his life, he was then polite but rather contemptuous. Of the charge he said : ‘c’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas selon les règles’ ; then he added :'No one but British cavalry would have done it.'
Describing the action in a letter to General Peyton, Colonel Souter estimated that the charge had resulted in between 200 and 300 of the enemy being sabred. Gafaar himself said he thought about 300. He adds:-
“Gafaar was not ‘dazed’, he was in a state of pitiable howling funk, and so were his staff, who ought to have shot us. . . . After Newbold and his machine-gun men came up I ordered Gafaar to mount , but he and his staff were always looking back, obviously hoping help would come, and he said he couldn’t ride on account of his wound. Newbold and I personally mounted him and got him away. . . . Where all officers did so well, I think it fairest that my three squadron leaders, who did everything I asked of them all day, and then led their squadrons so magnificently to the charge, should get the greater praise. Major Reeves, perhaps the best of them and my right-hand man, is dead. There remains Captain Gordon and Captain Dammers, both Dorset men, who have lived in Dorset for generations. It was a Dorset Yeomanry charge.”
Summary of action
The day cost the Dorsets some gallant lives. Major V.C.M. Reeves and Lieutenant J.C. Bengough, Gloucester Yeomanry (A.D.C. to General Peyton and attached to the regiment), fell in the preliminary Gallop ; 2nd Lieutenants C.H. Paulet, E. Middleton and C.B. Hope got through the enemy column and fell behind it ; twenty seven other ranks also fell. Major J.B.H. Gooden and 2nd lieut. O.C. Bryson and 24 other ranks were wounded. Eighty five horses were killed or missing. Such was the price paid by Dorset Yeomen for a feat of arm, which rang through the Empire and the fame of which should live in Dorset hearts and in cavalry annals for all time.
General Peyton in a letter describes aptly the effect the charge had on further operations :-
“That charge, following the brilliant Infantry attack by the South African Infantry Brigade, settled the small campaign, and although we did not reap its fruits until some three weeks later, it was the battle of Agagia, in which the Dorset Yeomanry took so leading a part, which really sealed the fate of the combined Turks and Senussi who had contemplated an attack on Egypt and had for some months held a large British force in check. . . . For Dorsetshire, August 21st, 1915, and February 26th, 1916, should be anniversaries to remember in connection with their County Yeomanry. A more gallant and splendid lot of officers and men I can never hope to have under my command.”
In the official communiqué in Cairo on February 28th, relating to the fight at Agagia, mention was made of "the brilliant and effective charge of the Dorset Yeomanry."
It was a great charge, in the words of the Arab commander himself it was "Bravery unparalleled". "It was not war", he said, "but it was immense. In theory it should have failed; in practice it succeeded, and I am today a prisoner. Nobody in the world could stand against such an onslaught; against men who evinced such scant regard for death."
Aftermath
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| Mass grave of QODY |
The whole Agagia operation, including the Dorset Yeomen's charge was reported to be a 'model of desert warfare', leading to the destruction of the Senussi force, the capture of its leader Gaafer Pasha and his staff, and the relief of Sidi Barrani. On 9 March 1916 General Peyton's force pursued the remnants of the enemy fifty miles west, with a force including the Dorset Yeomen and a company of the Australian Camel Corps. Three days later, the force secured the Medean Pass and approaching the Libyan boarder, the determined pursuit by the British forced the Senussi to evacuate Sollum without a fight. The Duke of Westminster led the final pursuit.
The Duke's armoured cars, now dug out of the soft sand, rounded up the enemy stragglers. They captured no less than forty enemy guns and machine-guns, took three Turkish officers and about forty other prisoners, while they killed a further fifty Senussi and wounded many more in an attack on the enemy camp at Bir Asiso, twenty-three miles west the British base.
Spearheaded by the Duke of Westminster and the Cheshire Yeomanry the British dashed west, covering some 120 miles across hostile territory without support to Bir Hakkim. In less than a month, Peyton's force, including the Dorset Yeomanry, whose charge at Agagia had made a highly significant contribution to the defeat of the Senussi, had driven the enemy back 150 miles. As a result, they all but eliminated the threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal from the Turkish supported attacks from the west.
Those killed in the charge
Pte J Biss, Pte E A Brister, Cpl S J Brister, Sgt H J Brown, L/Cpl Cadie, Pte T Chaffin, Pte E J Cooper, Pte C L A Cutler, Pte C Davidge, Pte W H Diment, Pte B S Down, Pte P Dunn, Pte F W Fox, Pte H C Frizzell, SS W Gould, Sgt W G Harris, Sgt G W Hellyar, 2 Lt C B A Hope, Pte W Meech, 2 Lt E Middleton, Pte W Norman, 2 Lt C H Paulet, Pte C O Randall, Maj V C M Reeves, Pte C Seaviour, Pte A J Shean, Pte W E Wakley, L/Sgt J F Waters, Pte C H Whicher, Pte W J Wiles |
| Alexandria (CHATBY) Military and War Memorial cemetery |
